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What is epistemic injustice? Who is vulnerable to it, and whom does it af-
fect? What forms does it assume? What are its political and social conse-
quences? And fi nally, how can we counter it? In a colossal volume extending 
over forty chapters, Ian James Kidd, Jose Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr. 
have collected a rich philosophical resource on epistemic injustice. Although 
epistemic injustice is roughly outlined to include those cases where a per-
son is harmed as an epistemic subject, it is, according to the authors, best 
understood by reference to the sheer plurality of its forms. The volume pro-
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gresses in a linear fashion: after opening with a section on central theoreti-
cal concepts, it elaborates on the philosophical and political ramifi cations 
of epistemic injustice and closes with case studies of localized injustices. As 
the editors stress in the introduction, our social setting of incessant com-
munication calls for special attention to the power dynamics immanent in 
those interactions. The authors, bridging the analytical-continental divide, 
draw from a diverse pool of intellectual sources. Amy Allen, for one, lauds 
Foucault’s analysis of the role of power in the production of knowledge (187), 
and Lisa Guenther expands epistemological debates to Merleau-Ponty and 
the phenomenological tradition (195).
The volume is structured into fi ve thematic clusters. The fi rst, titled 
Core concepts, introduces the reader to the vocabulary used in discussions 
about epistemic injustice, pointing at potential interpretative diffi culties 
and points of confl ict. Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr., for instance, underlines the dif-
fi culty of defi ning epistemic injustice without inadvertently excluding those 
experiences of marginalization obscured by our limited social perspective 
(14). Although the focus is chiefl y on those debates about epistemic injus-
tice that had followed Miranda Fricker’s eponymous work, the contributors 
acknowledge prior mentions of silencing and marginalization in feminist 
and intersectional discourse. With chapters defi ning the notions of testi-
monial and hermeneutical injustice, the fi rst cluster functions as a toolbox 
for navigating the rest of the volume, and literature on epistemic injustice 
in general. The second section, Liberatory epistemologies and axes of op-
pression, explores how discussions about epistemic injustice interact with 
political currents in feminism, racial theory, post-colonial movements, and 
disability studies. The third thematic unit, Schools of thought and subfi elds 
within epistemology, examines different philosophical toolkits that can 
aid us in thinking about epistemic injustice. The mentioned sources range 
from continental thought, such as that of Foucault and Merleau-Ponty, to 
the pragmatist tradition (205) and the nascent branch of vice epistemology 
(223). In the fourth section, Socio-political, ethical, and psychological di-
mensions of knowing, the authors consider non-epistemological approaches 
to the epistemic injustice. While some authors inquire about the psychologi-
cal phenomena of implicit bias and stereotype threat that often underlie un-
just epistemic interactions, others analyze epistemic wrongs from a politi-
cal perspective. The fi fth and fi nal thematic unit, Case studies of epistemic 
injustice, analyses the distinctive epistemic injustices that arise in specifi c 
political, scientifi c, professional, and social domains. Here, the authors link 
the unique epistemic confi guration of each domain to different manifesta-
tions of epistemic injustice. For the sake of simplicity, I will follow the vol-
ume’s structure in offering brief comments on some chapters of interest. 
Reviewing a volume that encompasses more than forty leading theorists in 
their fi eld is no small feat. I will do what I can.
Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr. opens the volume with a chapter on the general phe-
nomenon of epistemic injustice, and instantly recognizes the diffi culty of de-
fi ning such a broad fi eld without omitting some of its subtler implications. 
Striving, then, to defi ne epistemic injustice without unwittingly perpetrating 
it, Pohlhaus Jr. offers four lenses – or explanatory frameworks - for approach-
ing the concept. The fi rst lens approaches epistemic injustice by assessing 
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relationships of domination and oppression, and then explores how epistemic 
marginalization fi ts into these broader patterns. The second, drawing from 
the feminist tradition, focuses on intersubjectivity, or the shared epistemic 
institutions and practices that rear us into mature epistemic agents, and 
inquires about exclusions and breaches of trust. The third lens explores 
changes in epistemic systems, such as the systematic exclusion of specifi c 
perspectives that generates hermeneutical injustice. The fourth and fi nal 
lens considers epistemic labor and knowledge production, analyzing those 
cases where agents are barred from contributing, where their contributions 
are invalidated, or where they are expected to produce excessive testimony 
about their social position, so that their epistemic labor is exploited (22). To 
prevent overly narrow defi nitions of epistemic injustice, Pohlhaus Jr. advises 
against limiting our analytical toolkit to only one explanatory lens.
Continuing with a chapter on testimonial injustice, Jeremy Wanderer 
defi nes it as a form of injustice that is categorically connected with the so-
cial practice of testimony as an interaction between a speaker proffering 
knowledge and a hearer in need of information (27). Although he remains 
true to Fricker’s original account, inheriting most of her examples, Wan-
derer extends the analysis of testimonial injustice by considering its struc-
tural forms. Wanderer, thus, identifi es three main varieties of testimonial 
injustice. The fi rst is Fricker’s preferred notion of injustice as transactional, 
wherein a hearer attributes the speaker less credibility than she deserves 
because they harbor prejudice towards her social group. Echoing Elizabeth 
Anderson, Wanderer expands upon this strictly interpersonal account and 
introduces the second, distributive dimension of testimonial injustice. In 
such cases, speakers genuinely lack the required markers of credibility – 
such as a refi ned vocabulary or a fi rm grasp on grammar – due to struc-
tural inequalities in access to education. Wanderer then goes even further 
by proposing a third variety of testimonial injustice, testimonial betrayal, 
an emotionally saturated phenomenon that emerges between individuals 
otherwise involved in intimate relationships. When we are denied trust by 
someone we have come to depend on, testimonial injustice assumes a dis-
tinctive weight, the experience of “humiliating rejection” (38). It remains 
unclear whether the patterns of identity prejudice present in testimonial 
betrayal at all differ from those in ordinary cases of transactional injustice. 
In the third chapter on the varieties of hermeneutical injustice, Jose 
Medina adopts Fricker’s early defi nition of the phenomenon. Hermeneuti-
cal injustice, then, occurs when an individual or an entire community can-
not render their experiences meaningful to others due to gaps in collec-
tive interpretative resources, or, simply put, because their perspective is 
not accounted for in the public sphere. Yet, unlike Fricker, who depicted 
hermeneutical injustice as a structural occurrence without identifi able per-
petrators, Medina stresses our individual hermeneutical responsibility in 
treating eccentric statements and expressive styles with maximum charity. 
Medina distinguishes between different varieties of hermeneutical injustice 
by referring to their source, dynamics, breadth, and depth (45). The most 
extreme form of hermeneutical injustice he terms hermeneutical death, and 
defi nes it as the complete loss of one’s voice and one’s interpretative capaci-
ties, resulting in the inability to socially situate oneself as a complete sub-
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ject (41). Finally, Medina pleas for individual acts of hermeneutical resis-
tance and insurrection. To embolden those vulnerable to injustice, we must 
be especially charitable in interpreting their claims, which we, due to differ-
ences in perspectives and expressive styles, might initially struggle to un-
derstand. Medina stresses that oppressed subjects, as an act of resistance, 
can strategically refuse to adapt to dominant conversational practices and 
work on building alternative rhetorical spaces.
Miranda Fricker’s brief chapter on evolving concepts of epistemic injus-
tice functions both as a retrospective review of her early work and a glance 
into the future of the discipline. In an effort to defi ne the scope of discussion, 
she notes that, when speaking of epistemic injustice, she referred primar-
ily to discriminatory cases of it, rather than distributive, and that the focus 
was on unintentional – yet culpable – displays of prejudice. Fricker then 
pleads for an enlivened and humane philosophy that begins its inquiries 
with lived experiences of marginalization, and, in a normative twist, seeks 
to rectify dysfunctions in present epistemic practices (57). Finally, looking to 
promising developments in social moral epistemology, Fricker points to case 
studies of epistemic injustice in the domains of healthcare and psychiatry.
Proceeding with a chapter on distributive epistemic injustice, David Co-
ady argues that both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice can be fruitful-
ly understood as instances of unequal distribution. In the case of testimonial 
injustice, we are dealing with an unequal distribution of credibility: the fact 
that marginalized groups are, due to prejudice, awarded less trust, entails 
the fact that privileged groups are given too much trust in return. If a black 
defendant is distrusted by an all-white jury, it is because the jury is attrib-
uting too much credibility to his white plaintiffs. Attributions of credibility, 
in Coady’s view, sometimes function as a zero-sum game. Regarding herme-
neutical injustice, different groups can be said to compete for hermeneuti-
cal power. Hermeneutical injustice can thus be portrayed as the unequal 
distribution of meaning-making capacities, which is unfairly tilted towards 
privileged social groups. Coady then inquires whether certain groups, such 
as Neo-Nazis, can be justifi ably deprived of hermeneutical power, and calls 
for a more careful analysis of whether unequal distributions of credibility 
are always unjust (65). However, Coady’s account of hermeneutical injustice 
might be too broad, as he seems to confl ate infl uence on the public opin-
ion with hermeneutical power. In other words, although Neo-Nazis might 
struggle to make their opinions widely known, they are not systematically 
prevented from attaining self-understanding and forming a vocabulary for 
their experiences, which are the central facets of hermeneutical injustice.
In a brisk chapter on trust, distrust, and epistemic injustice, Katherine 
Hawley proposes a normative account of trustworthiness in interpersonal 
interactions. She surveys whether trust is an appropriate attitude in dif-
ferent relationships and inquires about the connection between trust and 
social power (71). Expanding on Wanderer’s account, Hawley explores the 
role of trust in accepting testimony. She then closes the chapter by inquir-
ing whether a lack of trust can give rise to epistemic injustice in otherwise 
non-culpable attributions of credibility.
In a chapter on forms of knowing and epistemic resources, Alexis Shot-
well argues that a stern focus on propositional knowledge is in itself a form 
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of epistemic injustice that fetters oppressed groups in improving their social 
position (87). She then calls for a broader account of other epistemic resourc-
es, such as emotions, skills, tacit knowledge, social position, and embodi-
ment. Shotwell, criticizing traditional thought experiments which endorse a 
distinction between knowing that and knowing how, claims that we base our 
identities on a more vibrant array of epistemic resources, and that the lived 
experiences of disability and bodily change cannot be grasped by reference 
to propositional knowledge alone. Epistemic justice, according to Shotwell, 
should account for the epistemic systems that oversee social relationships, 
emotions, and skills, rather than mere propositional transactions.
Lorraine Code, refl ecting upon her concept of epistemic responsibility, 
inquires why analytical epistemology had long lacked the vocabulary to 
form a coherent account of responsible epistemic behavior. Due to its re-
strictive individualism, inherited from logical positivism, analytical episte-
mology was reluctant to place its subject within society, as a knower who 
deliberates, feels, learns from others, and engages in interpersonal interac-
tions (91). This self-imposed limitation to an abstract and isolated subject 
hampered it in recognizing the salient social aspects of being a responsible 
agent. As social epistemology expanded to include ethical and political con-
cerns, prominent in discussions about epistemic injustice, talk of epistemic 
responsibility gained an additional normative dimension. What, then, are 
the requirements of responsible epistemic conduct? While epistemic respon-
sibility cannot be reduced to a universal set of rules, Code argues that we 
should always approach our agency as situated within a particular “epis-
temic imaginary,” an intellectual system akin to a Kuhnian paradigm or 
a Foucauldian episteme, which defi nes all epistemic practices in our social 
context. Code concludes the article by underlining the relevance of epis-
temic responsibility in the era of social networking and climate change de-
nial, proposing fruitful topics for further debate.
Charles W. Mills closes the fi rst section by rehabilitating the Marxist 
concept of ideology. Mills starts by noting that progressive academics have 
abandoned the notion of ideology in favor of postmodern conceptual tools, 
rendering debates about false consciousness either outmoded or seemingly 
conspiratorial (100). He explains ideology by noting that power differentials 
entail harmful epistemic consequences for all involved social groups, in that 
privileged groups actually cannot comprehend the social experience of op-
pressed factions. Central to the notion of ideology, according to Mills, is its 
materialism, or the fact that privileged groups have a vested socioeconomic 
interest in depicting extant inequalities as necessary. Mills illustrates this 
with the example of modern racism and explains how anti-black ideology 
attempts to depict socially generated inequalities as natural. Connecting 
ideology with contemporary discussions about epistemic injustice, he then 
argues that marginalized groups, albeit vulnerable to hermeneutical injus-
tice, enjoy unique epistemic access to their social experience, and can use 
this advantage to form alternative rhetorical spaces.
Patricia Hill Collins opens the second section with a chapter on intersec-
tionality, defi ning it as the project of connecting resistant forms of knowl-
edge and using this unity to subvert oppressive social structures (115). As 
intersectionality recognized that the experiences of belonging to a specifi c 
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gender, race, class, ethnicity, and sexuality overlap, it sought to create a 
platform for marginalized groups to voice their problems and demand so-
cial justice. Yet, according to Collins, its entrance into an academic context 
was met with persistent ignorance.  Since intersectionality’s focus on lived 
experiences clashed with the dominant epistemological paradigm of asocial 
objectivity, its pioneers struggled to connect the political project of attaining 
social justice with academic agency. Drawing from the history of black fem-
inist thought, Collins shows how intersectionality was, within academia, 
sanitized and stripped of its emancipatory potential. Collins then points at 
those academic practices, such as peer reviews and keynote lectures, which 
silence more radical intersectional endeavors, and calls for resistance to 
epistemic injustice.
In her chapter on feminist epistemology, Nancy Tuana trails how stand-
point theory aimed to unearth the interests implicit in professedly neutral 
scientifi c practices. Instead of starting with Fricker’s work, Tuana reverses 
the process, showing how debates on epistemic injustice resumed the ethi-
cal and political project launched by feminist epistemology. Feminist epis-
temologists, in Tuana’s recounting, focused on the subject of knowledge as 
a socially situated agent at the crossing of different identities, and explored 
how power differentials mold our ability to participate in intellectual ex-
changes. More specifi cally, they sought to disclose just what kind of person 
traditional epistemology presupposed by its asocial knower. Once this uni-
versal subject was revealed to be white, male, educated, able-bodied, and 
economically privileged (126), liberatory epistemologies strived to acknowl-
edge alternative perspectives and to oppose the institutional silencing of os-
tensibly strange or overly subjective voices. When writing about the subject 
of knowledge, Tuana explores which social features we must possess to be 
recognized as a credible epistemic agent. Much like Mills, she stresses that 
vulnerable groups have unique epistemic access to their social experience, 
and that privileged groups have a vested interest in remaining ignorant to 
the fact of their unjust opportunities. Tuana closes the article by recogniz-
ing the limits of her perspective and appealing for further opposition to 
epistemic violence.
With the chapter “Knowing disability, differently,” Shelley Tremain con-
cludes the second section by arguing that debates on epistemic injustice 
have failed to acknowledge disability. According to Tremain, this omission, 
evident in the usage of ableist metaphors, such as “epistemic blindness” and 
“epistemic deafness,” renders social epistemology short of a fully intersec-
tional approach (175). Tremain fi rst claims that disabled individuals are, 
due to social stigma, particularly vulnerable to unjust hermeneutical exclu-
sions that cannot be disregarded as mere epistemic bad luck. To further 
substantiate her point, Tremain shows that Fricker’s prized example of tes-
timonial injustice, the rigged trial against a black man, Tom Robinson, from 
Harper Lee’s novel To Kill a Mockingbird, does not account for the fact Rob-
inson was disabled. This fact, along with his race, class, and gender, played 
a crucial role in shaping his identity as an emasculated “conceptual impos-
sibility” in the eyes of his prosecutors (181). Since whites usually equate 
black men with virility, physical force, and callousness, they struggled to 
make sense of Robinson, a disabled black man who showed empathy for his 
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professed victim.  Inheriting Foucault’s concept of apparatus, the system of 
discourses, institutions, laws, administrative measures, moral norms and 
scientifi c statements that defi ne some phenomenon in a given historical mo-
ment, she then shows that, by including the apparatus of disability in our 
analyses, we construct a philosophically and politically more complete, and 
thus more emancipatory, account of epistemic injustice. Tremain ends by 
urging for a more attentive approach to disability in debates on epistemic 
injustice, and in social epistemology at large.
In her chapter on Foucault, Amy Allen dispels some common miscon-
ceptions about his attitude towards truth and argues that his thought is 
a fruitful resource for social epistemology. She focuses on three aspects of 
Foucault’s work. First, Allen explores his dual theory of power as both con-
stitutive and agential. Power, in Foucault’s rendition, both structures us as 
social subjects and takes places between subjects who, on a quotidian level, 
internalize and reproduce social power relations. Allen links this distinc-
tion to Fricker’s concepts of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, show-
ing how it can inform a richer understanding of epistemic harm. Second, 
she uses Foucault’s analysis of knowledge regimes to offer an alternative 
account of hermeneutic injustice. Foucault’s analysis of the historical pro-
cesses by which knowledge is justifi ed, institutionalized, and, fi nally, legiti-
mized as credible knowledge, can help us understand the epistemic exclu-
sions that generate hermeneutical injustice. Third, Allen rehabilitates his 
notion of genealogy, a “counter-memory that articulates subjugated knowl-
edges,” as a model of resistance against epistemic injustice (187). By cou-
pling marginalized experiences with historical erudition, we can place them 
within the appropriate context and attempt to counter them. Allen, wonder-
ing why Foucault is not more readily cited by scholars studying epistemic 
injustice, attributes this oversight to the animosity between analytical and 
continental philosophy, and to the widespread perception of Foucault as an 
epistemic reductionist. She concludes the chapter by underlining the eman-
cipatory potential of Foucault’s thought.
Sandorf Goldberg proceeds by analyzing epistemic injustice from the 
perspective of social epistemology. He broadly defi nes social epistemology 
as a philosophical branch concerned with the epistemic relevance of other 
minds, one focused on the way we acquire, store, and communicate informa-
tion in a social setting. Goldberg introduces his brand of social epistemol-
ogy as a middle way between Steve Fuller’s relativistic project and Alvin 
Goldman’s more normative approach: he acknowledges that knowledge is 
produced in a social setting, but, like Goldman, retains objective standards 
for its justifi cation. According to Goldberg, knowledge communities, formal 
and informal alike, manage their epistemic practices by imposing certain 
normative expectations upon other people. When approaching someone as a 
knower, regardless of whether they are an expert or a family member with 
whom we share our daily chores, we will expect them to substantiate their 
knowledge with a certain degree of evidence, or to display a certain degree 
of epistemic responsibility (215). If these expectations are illegitimate, they 
can generate epistemic injustices. First, injustice occurs when certain in-
dividuals are excluded from participating in epistemic practices, or when 
their contributions are invalidated, such as in male-dominated scientifi c 
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communities. Second, social practices can warrant normative expectations 
that treat people unjustly. Goldberg illustrates this with the example of low-
income schools that, due to structural limitations, have lower expectations 
of its students, and thus fail to rear them into fully functioning epistemic 
agents. Third, seemingly legitimate social practices can be enforced in a 
way that treats certain groups unjustly. Goldberg brings this point home by 
describing teachers who only interact with more successful students, thus 
effectively excluding struggling pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds, 
and notes cases of referees overlooking ethnic-sounding job applications. He 
closes the article by appealing for the utility of social epistemology in think-
ing about epistemic injustice.
Writing from the perspective of virtue epistemology and its nascent 
branch of vice epistemology, Heather Battaly examines whether testimo-
nial injustice can be understood as an epistemic vice. Battaly starts by 
broadly defi ning epistemic vices as bad cognitive dispositions that impede 
us in attaining knowledge, and then distinguishes among three notions of 
epistemic vice. First, there is effects-vice, the general stance that vices are 
dispositions, both constitutive of our characters and entirely impersonal, 
that result in adverse epistemic effects. Second, the notion of responsibilist-
vice implies that we have a bad character trait for which we are responsible, 
such as the motivated tendency to side with the easier solution, or to un-
critically uphold the status quo. Third, as a middle way, Battaly introduces 
personalist-vice, the stance that epistemic vices are intrinsically bad cogni-
tive traits which are not entirely under our control (228). She then argues 
that testimonial injustice usually takes the form of a personalist-vice, as 
we are partially exonerated for inheriting prejudiced beliefs from our social 
context, but still display bad cognitive traits. Battaly closes the article by 
encouraging further debate about whether we can be blamed for implicit 
epistemic vices that, due to social conditioning, slither beneath our con-
scious control.
In the opening chapter, Jennifer Saul examines the concepts of implicit 
bias and stereotype threat, defi ning them, in the above order, as the au-
tomatic tendency to identify a social group with certain features, and the 
fear that stereotypes might affect the way we are perceived by other people 
(235). Saul then denies that they should be treated as cases of epistemic 
injustice. First, according to Saul, someone can harbor implicit biases in-
herited from their social context without ever committing testimonial injus-
tice. Simply put, while implicit bias is strictly a psychological disposition, 
testimonial injustice requires interaction between a speaker and a biased 
hearer. Second, she argues that not all implicit biases are related to cred-
ibility. It is unclear, though, whether Fricker herself, once she had defi ned 
testimonial injustice, indeed limits it to defl ated attributions of credibility, 
or whether she allows for broader judgments of character. Third, implicit 
biases are wider than epistemic injustice in that they can also be positive, 
such as when whites automatically associate other whites with positive fea-
tures. This claim depends on whether we treat testimonial excess as a form 
of epistemic injustice, and whether we, as Coady does, consider testimonial 
excess a distributive epistemic failure. The link between testimonial injus-
tice and stereotype threat is, in Saul’s recounting, that of a self-fulfi lling 
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prophecy: members of stigmatized groups, fearing their testimony will not 
be received well, indeed deliver a shiftier and less convincing performance. 
Saul illustrates this with the examples of female mathematicians who un-
derperform due to pressure, and Aboriginal rape victims offering clumsy 
responses to hostile questions in court (238). Speaking of hermeneutical 
injustice, Saul notes that the concepts of implicit bias and stereotype threat 
had fi lled critical hermeneutical gaps, and that implicit biases often poten-
tiate hermeneutical marginalization. Finally, Saul inquires whether indi-
viduals can be trained to overcome their implicit biases. She concludes that, 
given these cognitive constrains, appeals to individual virtue must be sup-
plemented with institutional measures for countering epistemic injustice.
Lorenzo C. Simpson proceeds with a hermeneutical approach to political 
agency. He draws a distinction between fi rst-order agency, or the ability 
to act, and second-order agency, or the epistemic preconditions of choos-
ing a particular action. Simpson argues, albeit obliquely, that individuals 
who cannot fully understand their social experience and thus fail to make 
good choices are both epistemically and politically harmed. A correct under-
standing of our present state is, then, a precondition of just political agency. 
By asking “how things appear from the fi rst-person perspective from which 
these choices were made,” we can learn whether someone was epistemi-
cally hampered from making a better and more just decision (254). This 
approach, which he terms “narrative representability,” assesses the socially 
available courses of action for members of particular social groups. It also 
demotivates us from fallaciously “psychologizing the structural,” or, simply 
put, from making the false assumption that disadvantaged groups fail to 
thrive because of innate personal defi ciencies, rather than because of struc-
tural constraints. Simpson closes the article by stressing that the inability 
to articulate our social experience and the absence of democratic delibera-
tive platforms are in themselves epistemically unjust.
Sally Haslanger closes the fourth section by analyzing the relation-
ship between objectivity, epistemic objectifi cation, and oppression. What 
Haslanger wants to explore is how the notion of objectivity sustains oppres-
sion by portraying the socially conditioned epistemic weaknesses of disad-
vantaged groups as inherent to their nature. Haslanger fi rst detects three 
ways of thinking about objectivity: objective reality, objective discourse, and 
objective knowledge. While objective reality pertains to the world as it is, re-
gardless of how we conceptualize it, objective discourse refers to discourses 
for expressing facts, and objective knowledge encompasses claims accessible 
to any rational agent (279). Objectivity is, according to Haslanger, closely 
linked to certain forms of essentialism, the idea that observed regularities 
express a thing’s nature. Essentialism often entails normative assumptions, 
in that what is statistically “normal” of a thing becomes desirable, or repre-
sentative of its ideal form. The failure to recognize that certain features are 
conditioned by social circumstances “leads us to attribute the regularities to 
something intrinsic to the agents” (284). In Haslanger’s example, if women 
are structurally barred from attaining decent education, their seeming in-
ability to participate in the public sphere may be fallaciously attributed to 
innate domesticity. Similarly, a social structure that unloads the burden 
of childbearing on women sustains the essentialist claim that women are 
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inherently more nurturing. This kind of status quo reasoning, when cou-
pled with unjust social institutions, results in the looping effect: members 
of vulnerable groups are conditioned to attain the unseemly characteris-
tics that are then considered part of their nature. Once the social origin of 
present inequalities becomes invisible, status quo reasoning justifi es these 
inequities by naturalizing them. Haslanger exemplifi es this with the case 
of black people receiving inadequate education, which denies them the rel-
evant markers of credibility and confi nes them to poorly paid menial labor. 
She then identifi es three distinct forms of objectifi cation that lead to epis-
temic injustice: ideological, projective, and Kantian objectifi cation (285). It 
is ideological objectifi cation that conceals the contingent social roots of our 
unjust epistemic practices and portrays artifi cial inequalities as natural. 
Haslanger ends by stressing that a focus on individual rather than struc-
tural solutions and a bias towards stability contribute to epistemic and so-
cial injustice, and that epistemic justice will require us to dismantle unjust 
social structures.
To sum up, Kidd, Medina, and Pohlhaus, Jr. have compiled a fruitful 
collection of topics that warrants philosophical attention and will surely 
inspire further inquiry. The volume, however, harbors a general tendency 
that is worth noting: its authors, aiming for maximum inclusiveness, almost 
unanimously overlook the question of epistemic quality. There is no men-
tion of whether distrusting underprivileged individuals who lack the rel-
evant markers of credibility, albeit it entrenches inequality, can sometimes 
be epistemically justifi ed. This trend of disregarding epistemic quality, or 
its lack, actually makes the authors less attentive to the systemic barriers 
that prevent vulnerable groups from attaining a decent education. The de-
sire to attain social justice thus results in less social justice, as we end up 
with an incomplete understanding of the social institutions which, through 
inequitably distributed education and inaccessible deliberative platforms, 
reproduce unjust epistemic asymmetries. As this insight was fully pres-
ent in Elizabeth Anderson’s much earlier article on the structural causes 
of epistemic injustice, we may wonder whether social moral epistemology 
should want to revisit a more grounded approach. Nevertheless, anyone 
interested in epistemic injustice is well advised to expand their analytical 
vocabulary with the tools here offered, and certain topics, such as Carel and 
Kidd’s analysis of epistemic wrongs in healthcare, promise fecund practical 
applications. There is certainly more philosophical work to be done, as most 
authors diagnose social maladies, leaving their solutions open for future 
discussions.
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